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FEDERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS
By ED. R. MOYLAN, of the Denver Bar.

N 1932, a wealthy citizen of Colorado, let us call him
John Jones, desiring that his minor daughter in her more
mature years might have an income, set up an irrevocable
trust for that purpose, naming a Denver bank as the trustee.
The income therefrom was to be accumulated and added to
the principal until the time of distribution. The instrument
comprising the trust contained inter alia, this provision, of
more or less common usage:
"The income from the trust shall be accumulated and added to the
principal until the termination of this trust provided that Celiste Jones,
who was twelve years of age on August 1, 1932, may at any time after
attaining the age of 27 years, request that the income arising after the
date of her request be paid to her as long as she may live, and provided
further that if at any time before the said Celiste Jones attains the age
of 27 years, her support and education is not sufficiently provided for
from other sources, the trustee may from time to time pay any income
thereafter arising from the trust fund to or for the benefit of the said
Celiste Jones, upon the approval of the Trustor or his wife, or without
such approval if neither the Trustor or his wife be living."

In the latter part of 1936 an agent from the Denver Division, Department of Internal Revenue, examined into the
setup of this trust and thereafter sent a copy of his report
thereon to the trustee.
The agent stated in his report that this was an irrevocable
trust; that it was for the benefit of the minor child; that the
trustor had no power to alter or modify any provision thereof,
but his report contained the following pertinent statement:
"Inasmuch as the income of this trust may be used for the support
and maintenance of this minor daughter, the income is taxable to the
grantor under the provisions of Section 167, Revenue Act of 1934."

No tax liability had been shown on the trustee's return for
two years for the' reason that the income reported was insufficient in amount and kind to be reached by the tax.
The trustor was already paying an income tax that reached
into the high surtax brackets, making these additional taxes
on the income from the trust a considerable burden. Immediately thereafter the trustor's attorney filed a protest on this
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assessment with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the theory
that, as the trustor retained no title to the property conveyed
by the trust instrument, no control over the terms of the
trust and no interest in the distribution of the trust income,
the tax was arbitrary and unlawful.
Counsel further set forth that the gift to the minor
daughter was present, executed and outright, and that the
gift-tax thereon had been assessed and paid and further argued
that to establish the contention that the income from the
property of this irrevocable trust (the application of such income being for the benefit of others), was nevertheless the
income of the trustor and might lawfully be taxed as his
property, required something more tangible than a mere supposition that in the distant future, some part of the income
of this trust might be used to discharge a legal obligation of
the trustor i. e. the support of his child. He pointed out that
the trustor was not bound to set aside a trust fund for his
minor child. He was, it is true, charged with her support but
he was not further charged.
The agent's interpretation was claimed to be arbitrary
and irrational. The line of demarkation between the rational
and the arbitrary in legislation, it was pointed out, was not to
be drawn with an eye to remote possibilities. 1. *
The agent in charge in Denver sustained the agent who
assessed the tax basing his decision on the language of the
Supreme Court in recently decided cases. 2.*
Jones' counsel contended that the decisions depended on
by the taxing authority were not in point with his case and
were distinguished from it in the following particulars:
1. Jones had created an irrevocable trust.
2. He had divested himself of every incident of control
over the trust estate.
3. He could not on the happening of any contingency
have a reversion of the corpus of the trust.
1.* Barnett vs. Wells, 289 U. S. 670.
2.* Douglas vs. Willcuts, 290 U. S. 56 Supreme Court 58.
Helvering vs. Blumenthal, 56 Supreme Court 305.
Commissioner vs. Stokes, 56 Supreme Court 308.
Commissioner vs. Schweitzer, 56 Supreme Court 304.
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The statute provides that the income of the trust is taxable to the beneficiary if the following three requirements are
met:
1. The income must be income from property held in
trust.
2. The trust must not be a revocable trust.
3. The trust must not provide that the income be distributed to the grantor, or accumulated for future distribution
to the grantor in his discretion either alone or in conjunction
with one not a beneficiary. To the extent that any part of
the income of the trust is so distributed or accumulated, such
part of the income is taxable to the grantor.*
(The tax to the beneficiary would be greatly less than if
assessed to the trustor on account of the latters high surtax.)
The sections of the statute which impose the second and third
requirements above set forth were intended to apply to actual
transfers of property to trustees where certain substantial
rights to or control over the property or income therefrom
were retained by the grantor.
Congress undoubtedly intended by the enactment of these
provisions to prevent a taxpayer from reducing, or altogether
avoiding his income tax liability by the creation of a trust to
hold income-producing property and the retention of a power
which would enable him at will, to withdraw the property
or direct the payment of the income to himself. Securities
First National Bank of Los Angeles Exes. 28 B. T. A. 288.
Counsel citing this case demanded to know on what
theory the Internal Revenue Department arrived at its decision, that Jones should be taxed on the income of the trust
he had set up, and on the property rights he had divested
himself of in order that this property should produce income
to take care of his daughter.
Income taxable by virtue of the Sixteenth Amendment
had been clearly defined by the United States Supreme Court.
Derived income was stated to be the indispensable characteristic of taxable income. 4.*
*Sec. 167, Revenue Act, 1934.
4.* Eisner vs. Macomber, 40 Supreme Court 193.
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Hence counsel asked how could Jones have derived any
income from this trust, unless he applied part, at least, of the
trust income to the support of his daughter. The highest
court had declared that in tax cases, as in all others, facts must
not be slighted in favor of suppositions.
An outstanding fact was that no income of the trust was
ever devoted to the support of Jones' daughter.
The only theory on which Jones was taxed was that the
trust agreement provided that at some future time, before the
beneficiary reached the age on which distribution was to be
made to her, should she not receive from other sources enough
for her support and maintenance, then and in that event the
trustee should pay the income to her. The fact that the trust
agreement contained such a clause was by the Bureau deemed
a benefit to the trustor, and the Bureau sought to tax such a
benefit. When we speak of taxing benefits, we venture into
the realm of economics, but economists' definitions of income
have been previously rejected by the Supreme Court of the
United States. 5.*
It is not yet the law that all economic benefits, no matter
how contingent or remote, constitute taxable income. This
theory finally prevailed.
On July 28, 1937, while the office of general counsel was
occupied by a distinguished member of the Denver Bar the
widely discussed case of Black vs. Commissioner came before
the Board of Tax Appeals. It is reported in 36 B. T. A.,
page 346. The facts are as follows:
The Commissioner determined a deficiency of $2,559.56
in petitioner's individual income tax for 1934. Aside from
minor adjustments, which are not assailed, the Commissioner
included in petitioner's income $8,000.00 on dividends on
corporate shares held by four trusts created by petitioner in
1933, of each which petitioner's wife and three minor children were the respective beneficiaries. This ruling was duly
protested.
The Board of Tax Appeals in upholding the taxpayer's
contention said:
5.* Eisner vs. Macomber, 40 Supreme Court 193.
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is in error. The trusts were complete and irrevocable. Petitioner had
no right to the income either presently or prospectively and none of it
actually came to him. He did not benefit by its use for the support and
maintenance of his wife and children or in the discharge of his own obligations (Cf Commissioner vs. Grosvenor, 85 Fed.) (2), and the trusts
were at all times administered with a strict regard for their separate
jural personalities. There is no occasion, therefore, to regard the income
as constructively received by Petitioner."
Judgment was entered under Rule 50.
Shortly after the decision in the Black case this very pertinent memo issued from the office of the General Counsel:
(2) G. M. C. 18972, XV-33
8882 (p- 6 ):
"The next question to be considered is what part, if any, of the
income of trusts is taxable to the grantor under Section 167 of the
Revenue Acts of 1933 and 1934? * * * This office has reached
the conclusion that in cases where the trust income or at least part of it
might in the discretion of the trustee have been used to support the minor
children of the grantor, there should be taxed to the grantor only so
much of the trust's income as is actually distributed for the support
and maintenance of the beneficiaries whom the grantor is legally obliged
to support. The fact that the trust's income may be distributed for the
support of such persons (but actually is not) does not make any such
income subject to distribution to the grantor within the meaning of
Section 167 of the Revenue Acts herein involved. The opinion in E. E.
Black promulgated by the Board of Tax Appeals on July 28, 1937,
36 B.T.A. No. 55 (p. 346). Acquiescence published on page 1 of this
bulletin clearly states the rule."
In view of the above decision and memo the protest of
Jones' Counsel prevailed and Jones' income was not subjected
to the tax.

The General Counsel who wrote this memo, defining the
future course of the department, thus putting at rest the mind
of many a harassed taxpayer, is no longer with the Internal

Revenue Department.* He also saw fit to disagree with some
of its other policies and is again engaged in the general practice of law having won high esteem for his independence and

legal ability before resigning.
*Hon. Morrison Shafroth.

